4
The Army’s Essential Research Programs

The Army Futures Command (AFC) Combat Capabilities Development Command (DEVCOM) is the primary component in the Army’s science and technology (S&T) enterprise. Among its charges is to anticipate future technologies. DEVCOM is home to the Army Research Laboratory (ARL), which conducts approximately 90 percent of the Army’s early-stage (6.1-6.2) research.¹ ARL’s mission is to rapidly transition innovations from the laboratory to the battlefield and aligns most of its research with the Army’s cross-functional teams (CFTs), such as long-range precision fires and next-generation combat vehicles.²

While other Army components also perform 6.1-6.2 research, ARL is the only laboratory with a primary mission to advance early-stage research. Currently, as indicated by Deputy Director Joseph Alexander of ARL, the primary goal of ARL is to get 6.1-6.2 research out to soldiers as rapidly as possible.³

Operationally, this objective provides the greatest benefit to troops, as newer technologies will lead to improvements in the fighting force. However, the focus on rapid advancement of 6.1-6.2 technologies to higher technology readiness levels (TRLs) for deployment can lead to preferential selection of near-term research objectives. Alexander indicated that 6.1 research is aligned to the AFC CFTs. While these topics are broad, the overarching CFTs and the Essential Research Programs (ERPs) that have been developed in support of them provide a level of rigidity that, while useful for focused application-driven research, does not lend itself to the innate adaptability that will arise from preparing for technology surprise.

Furthermore, Alexander indicated that the decision to sunset or realign core competencies, as well as horizon scanning, primarily falls on the ARL board of directors, which consists of five individuals.⁴ The lack of systematic input from futures thinking to S&T overall, plus the practical considerations of a small panel, can run counter to the need to expand understanding beyond the known possibilities, which raises the chances of preventing technology surprise.

DEFINITION: THE ARMY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ENTERPRISE

The key components that make up the Army’s S&T enterprise are in DEVCOM’s lead organizations for the Army’s eight S&T domains. But much like the ubiquity of technology, the

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¹ Speaker discussion from Jeff Thomas, Director, Science and Technology Integration DEVCOM, to Committee on Preventing Technology Surprise, January 8, 2025.

² U.S. Army, 2023, “Letter to the Force: Army Transformation Initiative,” Army.mil, last updated February 29, https://www.army.mil/article/285100/letter_to_the_force_army_transformation_initiative.

³ Speaker discussion from Joseph Alexander, Deputy Director, ARL, to Committee on Preventing Technology Surprise, January 8, 2025.

⁴ Ibid.

Army’s complete S&T enterprise also involves multiple organizations and individuals spread throughout government, industry, and academia that, in turn, are part of a larger global S&T ecosystem. Broadly speaking, the committee identified contributors to the enterprise as those who work to transform scientific concepts into useful capabilities for the warfighter. A simple way to categorize this community is to identify them as any recipients of Budget Activity 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, or a portion of 6.4 Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) funds.⁵

Budget activities tend to be correlated with organizational missions. For instance, ARL is considered the “Army’s research laboratory” whose mission is to “operationalize science.” This means that its budget activities are primarily 6.1 and 6.2. ARL is one of eight lead organizations for the Army’s eight S&T domains. The others include the following:

• DEVCOM Analysis Center
• DEVCOM Armaments Center
• DEVCOM Aviation & Missile Center
• DEVCOM C5ISR Center
• DEVCOM Chemical Biological Center
• DEVCOM Ground Vehicle Systems Center
• DEVCOM Soldier Center

As illustrated by Figure 4-1, the Army uses a linearized paradigm that assumes a nearly sequential transition path from discovery to deployable product. Only two of the DEVCOM organizations, ARL and the Chemical Biological Center, have stated missions that include the consideration of fundamental research and 6.1 budget activity. Additionally, ARL is the only organization that is exclusively limited to budget activities below the 6.3 level. Each organization within DEVCOM develops its work plans largely independent of each other but are aligned with high-level, overarching goals, such as the Army’s modernization priorities.⁶

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⁵ U.S. Department of the Army, 2024, U.S. Army Acquisition Program Portfolio: The Army of Today, the Technology of the Future, Q3FY24 ed., Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology), p. 35.

⁶ U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2024, Weapon Systems: Annual Assessment, GAO-24-106831, June, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-24-106831.pdf.

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⁷ W.T. Moye, 1997, The Genealogy of ARL, ARL-P 360-2, U.S. Army Research Laboratory, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA383226.pdf.

⁸ Panel discussion from Oleksiy Osiyevskyy, Professor, University of Calgary, to Committee on Preventing Technology Surprise, March 5, 2025.

• Transformational SynBio for Military Environments (TRANSFORME)
• Versatile Tactical Power and Propulsion (VICTOR)
• Science of Additive Manufacturing for Next Generation Munitions (SAMM)⁹

The committee was also presented with the New Cross Competency Major Programs (NCCMPs). These were developed with the intent of instituting a “continuous data-driven cycle of assessing, strategizing, and implementing”¹⁰ with other Department of War (DoW) departments and industry partners. The NCCMPs are not new ERPs but are programs to supplement the work of ARL. They are as follows:

• Modular, Quickly Deployed, Deep Sensing Munitions (MRF)
• Full-Spectrum Short/Ultrashort Pulse Lasers for Counter Sensor/Counter Munition (PULSE)
• Adaptable, Flex Energy Generation and Distribution (ERSO)
• Attritable, Networked, Autonomous, Modular UAS (P2A2CE)
• Artificial Intelligence (AI) Network to Leverage Sensors and Autonomous Platforms in the Battlespace (RAA)

The intent of the Army’s ERPs is to “focus on answering challenging, high-risk questions that converge to provide research outcomes and shape concepts to curtail technological surprise, prevent overmatch, and get ahead of the threat before the threat is even aware of the technology.”¹¹ However, the ARL mission and its authorized budget activities are somewhat at odds and not easy to reconcile. On one hand, efforts such as Mad Scientist, have no discernable input to ARL’s work.¹² On the other, that work’s ties to mission capability (particularly the next generation of ERPs) and budget activity classifications metrics drives deliverables in a way that typically requires 6.3 and up funding to achieve their vision. The next generation of ERPs is not yet determined, despite the fact that the first one of the current generation, VICTOR, is set to expire in 2026. This conflicting mission and programming alignment leans heavily toward modernization priorities and budget realities which, in turn, can obscure the organization’s vision and cap its creativity.

Finding 4-1: Army modernization priorities implicitly expect science and technology organizations to work beyond their own boundaries, creating a continuing risk of driving lower-TRL research toward engineering and away from science.

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⁹ Speaker discussion from Joseph Alexander, Deputy Director, ARL, to Committee on Preventing Technology Surprise, January 8, 2025.

¹⁰ U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Army Research Laboratory (DEVCOM ARL), n.d., “What We Do,” https://arl.devcom.army.mil/what-we-do, accessed June 12, 2025.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Speaker presentation from Matthew Santaspirt, Deputy Director, Mad Scientist, to Committee on Preventing Technology Surprise, March 6, 2025.

ESSENTIAL RESEARCH PROGRAM ALIGNMENT WITH STRATEGIC POLICY

As a starting point, the committee reviewed available, authoritative technology policies from the administration, DoW, and from Sandia National Laboratories. They included the following:

• White House Critical and Emerging Technologies List, February 2024¹³
• DoW Critical Technologies List¹⁴
• AFRL Core Technical Competencies (CTCs)—similar to DoW’s 2022¹⁵ Sandia National Laboratories Research Areas¹⁶

The committee noted strong correlation throughout the several technology policies with multiple technologies often duplicated across documents (Table 4-1). Of note, Advance Computing, Networked Sensing, Artificial Intelligence, Biotechnologies, and Networking and Quantum information technologies were present in all four of the documents. The committee also noted a comparable correlation to the ERPs; every ERP covered at least one technology and most covered multiple areas. VICTOR was the most frequent correlation, covering seven technologies outlined in the policies.

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¹³ National Science and Technology Council, 2024, “Critical and Emerging Technologies List Update,” Fast Track Action Subcommittee on Critical and Emerging Technologies, February, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ostp/nstc.

¹⁴ Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, “Critical Technology Area Roadmaps,” https://dod-critical-technology-area-roadmaps.zoiclabs.io, accessed June 24, 2025.

¹⁵ Air Force Research Laboratory, 2022, “Cross-Cutting Technology Capabilities,” Fact Sheet, AFRL-2022-4295, https://www.afrl.af.mil/Portals/90/Documents/RI/AFRL_RI%20CTC%20Fact%20Sheet%20AFRL-2022-4295.pdf.

¹⁶ Sandia National Laboratories, n.d., “Research,” https://www.sandia.gov/research, accessed June 12, 2025.

TABLE 4-1 Overlap in Research Areas Between the Essential Research Programs and Critical Technology Lists

TECHNOLOGY STRENGTHS AND CAPABILITY GAPS

Vignettes can play an important role to enhance futures thinking by imagining future possibilities and unexpected outcomes. As a part of this study, the committee developed vignettes to perform a gap analysis of the ERPs. Each vignette describes an imagined scenario, is entirely fictional, and falls into one of two broad categories. First, there are the ERPs authored to support the ERP strength analysis, which includes the range of known possibilities (i.e., they are rooted in the threats we observe or reasonably foresee in global conflict today). The second supports the ERP gap analysis and is designed specifically to expand on the range of known possibilities, increase the number of possible outcomes, and inspire creative ideas about how future technologies might evolve. In both cases, the vignettes list sample questions, called “S&T opportunities,” which are designed to inspire research in new, creative ways. The complete set of vignettes is provided in Appendix C. Beyond the gap analysis of this section and its usefulness for futures thinking, vignettes are also helpful for thinking about the experimentation and validation life cycles.

Even if a vignette is not used as the basis for a Horizon 2¹⁷ or Horizon 3 scanning activity, simply the act of conceiving a vignette can show the tremendous variability in what may constitute a surprise, its amorphous nature, and the range of possible outcomes. The breadth and

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¹⁷ Horizon 2 scanning looks at emerging innovations that are predictable. It falls under a 2–5-year timeframe.

diversity of technologies and operational scenarios generated are remarkable and reinforces the need for results to be shared more systematically with the researchers and their leadership for review and consideration.

In evaluating the existing ARL ERPs against the vignettes, the committee found, as expected, that the ERPs are generally well focused and necessary to mitigate technology surprise. The ERPs are combinations of competencies and cross-competencies, which are, in turn, evolved from assessments of technological needs that have been performed periodically by the Army for more than a century.¹⁸

Finding 4-2: ERPs are well focused for the most part and are a necessary tool in mitigating technology surprise.

Conclusion 4-1: Based on the vignette analysis, in addition to the other available government, defense department, and private-sector priorities, the ERPs (and the cross-competency models that are to augment them) are sufficient to address the possible known futures.

Essential Research Program Strength Analysis

The vignettes were analyzed for the relevant technologies and these technologies were then tied back to the ERPs. The analysis entailed identifying common underpinning technical domains between each vignette and each ERP. The vignettes were then used as a basis for exploration, showing new opportunities for ERPs to shape future battlefield technologies. The results of this analysis are summarized in Table 4-2.

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¹⁸ U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Army Research Laboratory (DEVCOM ARL), n.d., “What We Do,” https://arl.devcom.army.mil/what-we-do, accessed June 12, 2025.

TABLE 4-2 Vignette Analysis Chart

The committee judges the underpinning technical domains in the ERPs largely appeared in the vignettes. The ERPs were therefore well focused and necessary to protect against potential combat opportunities and threats. Examples of ERPs that share underpinnings with the generated vignettes include the following:

• Long Range and Distributed and Collective Engagement (LRDCE) and MRF cross competency
  • Vignette 29
• Electronic Warfare in Multi-Domain Operations (FREEDOM) and PACE
  • Vignette 1
  • Vignette 10
  • Vignette 13
  • Vignette 27
• Human-Autonomy Teaming (HAT) and ERSO
  • Vignette 13
  • Vignette 25
• AI for Maneuver and Mobility (AIMM) and RAA
  • Vignette 7
  • Vignette 16
  • Vignette 24
• Emerging Overmatch Technologies (EOT), PULSE, RAA, and PACE
  • Vignette 1

• • Vignette 7
  • Vignette 9
  • Vignette 10
  • Vignette 15
  • Vignette 16
  • Vignette 17
  • Vignette 24
• Versatile Tactical Power and Propulsion (VICTOR) and ERSO
  • Vignette 1
  • Vignette 9
  • Vignette 10
  • Vignette 25
• Quantum Info Sciences—Positioning, Navigation and Timing (QIS-PNT) and P2A2CE
  • Vignette 11
• Soldier Protection to Defeat Evolving Threats (PSP)
  • Vignette 12
  • Vignette 18
• Transformational Synthetic Biology (TRANSFORME)
  • Vignette 14
  • Vignette 29
• Additive Manufacturing for Modular Munitions (SAMM) and MRF
  • Vignette 29

Essential Research Program Gap Analysis

The committee investigated whether S&T investments should be increased, remain the same, or decrease in a particular ERP, but could not reach any definitive conclusions, as more detailed project-level insight (not within scope for this study) would be required. As noted above, the current ERPs, as well as the next generation of cross competency programs, appear to provide a sufficiently broad coverage of necessary topics. Any of the vignettes listed in Appendix C could be used to develop scenarios for Army Horizon 2-3 scanning programs that challenge assumptions and expand thinking. However, the committee believes some of them are particularly well suited to imagining new futures, challenging current assumptions, and expanding imagination to previously undiscovered possibilities.

The vignettes that may warrant continued Horizon 2-3 scanning efforts, and the general challenges that they illustrate, include the following:

• Vignette 2
• Vignette 3
• Vignette 4
• Vignette 5
• Vignette 6
• Vignette 8
• Vignette 9
• Vignette 14

• Vignette 16
• Vignette 18
• Vignette 19
• Vignette 21
• Vignette 23
• Vignette 26

Recommendation 4-1: The Army should incorporate scenarios analogous to these into its Horizon 2 and 3 scanning efforts to improve its comprehension of the range of possible outcomes and to inform science and technology investments with new, more creative opportunities.

The committee acknowledges that some of these suggestions for new work might be more appropriately assigned to further downstream DEVCOM activities in budget activities of 6.4 or higher. However, every threat listed in a vignette is also an opportunity for the Army to get there first with its own implementation before its adversaries. Much like the systems approach outlined in “Integrating Talent, Technology, and Leadership,” the committee notes that this creative process applies both to preventing surprise as well as inflicting surprise.

Market Research

One of the principal data points that the committee believes could drive future S&T investment by the Army is whether a technology is expected to have a commercial application. Therefore, the committee sought out and reviewed top-level publicly available investment information about the Army, other U.S. agencies, and the private sector in areas relevant to or comparable to the ERPs. Albeit imprecise, available budget figures serve as indirect measures of the likelihood for dual-use possibilities.

The analysis compared the external figures with the published values of ARL’s budget and the S&T budgets for DoW and the Army. This allowed the committee to assess the cost of programs in balance with national security and Army technology needs, and the overall value of the programs in the context of mitigating technology surprise. The comparable data were compiled for each of the 10 ERPs, and the committee developed a “heat map” based on this analysis. This high-level budget data and its analytic recommendations are not meant to be prescriptive, rather they are to focus S&T leaders’ attention and consideration for capability improvements, possible gaps, duplication, or even confirmation of the current course of action.

The detailed analysis that forms the heat map color for each ERP is in Appendix B.

Recommendation 4-2: The Army should review Essential Research Program project-level data, in light of the enormous amounts of private investment in some of those areas.

TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION: AN UPDATED MODEL

The committee believes that an updated technology adoption model is needed to better inform S&T decisions, particularly considering the Chief of Staff’s Transformation in Contact

Initiative.¹⁹ As noted in the “History and Evolution of ERPs” section of this chapter, the Army’s S&T community occupies a complicated space, as it simultaneously supports modernization initiatives as well as discovery of the next generation of capabilities. While not a perfect model, the proposed update below includes criteria necessary to address both priorities and provides a disciplined approach that should lend consistency, transparency, and a degree of accountability to S&T decisions.

The committee proposes the following criteria for a technology adoption model (Figure 4-2):

• Alignment with modernization efforts and/or executive agency functions. The Transformation in Contact Initiative leaves the Army with the following five modernization priorities: Future Vertical Lift, Long Range Precision Fires, Next Generation Combat Vehicle, Networks, and Soldier Lethality. Adoption of, or investment in, any emerging technology should be able to eventually support at least one of these established priorities. Additionally, DoW has designated the Army as the Executive Agent for 34 mission areas, many of which may have an S&T component and should receive consideration under the proposed technology adoption model.²⁰
• Alignment with the civilian market. Dual-use potential refers to the likelihood that a desired technology will have a commercial application and therefore be likely to receive considerable private-sector investment. If a desired technology is likely to be successfully developed for commercial use, the Army has little need to invest its own S&T dollars, except perhaps in support of technology adoption.
• Responsiveness to threats or opportunities. It is important for the U.S. Army to invest and adopt technologies that possess the potential to be disruptive (inflict surprise) or respond to threats (prevent surprise). This will ensure readiness and superiority in the face of evolving threats while maintaining operational advantage and meeting mission requirements.
• Suitability of TRL. TRL remains the standard framework to quantify the maturity of technology and inform the decision to invest or adopt and monitor. Technologies that have a TRL below 4 are more difficult to tie to military requirements and similarly, the ability to foresee dual-use potential is more difficult as well. The committee believes that all things being equal, TRL higher than 4 suggests that substantial S&T investments by others have already been made and that further Army S&T investment may produce diminishing returns.
• Suitability for integration. The decision to adopt or invest in new technology is highly reliant on its resiliency to Army operational environments, interoperability to existing systems, and useability. TRL 5 or higher technologies marked for “monitor” would generally not receive significant Army S&T investment, but those chosen for “adopt” may well benefit from S&T funding and speed its adoption to the field.
• Potential to meet the “ilities.” The Army’s decision to invest in various emerging technologies is becoming increasingly reliant on its ability to meet critical

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¹⁹ T. South, 2025, “Army Expanding ‘Transformation in Contact’ Initiative to Army Guard,” Army Times, June 18, https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2025/06/18/army-expanding-transformation-in-contact-initiative-to-army-guard.

²⁰ U.S. Department of War, n.d., “DoD Executive Agent Program—Search Results,” https://DoD-executiveagent.osd.mil/Agents/Search.aspx?catId=46&psaId=46&op=Or, accessed June 12, 2025.

• performance attributes also known as “ilities.” These include affordability, feasibility, survivability, sustainability, supportability, maintainability, and transportability among others. Technology that does not meet this requirement should be closely monitored as it may still have the potential of being adopted in the future. In such cases, as with the integration criteria above, S&T investments may be useful to provide the necessary modifications for fielding.
• Facilitation of independent operations in a contested environment. There is a need for the Army to be prepared to maintain functionality in circumstances where networks are disrupted, supply chains are constrained, and units are dispersed. Technologies being developed must be able to perform in contested, degraded, and operationally limited conditions. They must be secure, robust, autonomous, and interoperable while facilitating freedom of action and flexibility.

Recommendation 4-3: The Army should develop and use a technology adoption model that more precisely accounts for factors such as early investment risk, dual-use potential, and long-term military value.

TABLE 4-3 Vignette 1 Technology Adoption Model

This technology aligns with the modernization efforts of DoW. There is not a civilian market for the technology. Continuing through the flowchart, a conceptual design for the system would be needed. This technology could be integrated with existing Army systems at a company level. Since the technology is generally passive, it can be sustained in the field. Furthermore, such a system could be hardened to ensure durability and reliability. Additionally, this system has the potential to allow the Army to better facilitate their operations in a contested environment.

Vignette 6

The alignment of Vignette 6 with the technology adoption model is shown in Table 4-4.

TABLE 4-4 Vignette 6 Technology Adoption Model

This example shows a technology that at its core should be used with other organizations and monitor their progress, as it does not align with any modernization priorities. However, there are some aspects of this technology that can be used for enhanced surveillance for DoW. That technology could make it through the flowchart and would be a potential target for S&T investment.

Vignette 2

The alignment of Vignette 2 with the technology adoption model is shown in Table 4-5.

TABLE 4-5 Vignette 2 Technology Adoption Model

This example has the potential to align with several modernization priorities including the use of AI. However, there is a large civilian market that is also focusing on disinformation for the civilian market. In this case, the Army may be in a better position to monitor and leverage the advances from the commercial sector.